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Selective conscientious objection is not just an idea whose time has not yet corne; it is one that
those who value democratic principles and human rights should hope never comes.
The central flaw in Jeff McMahan's proposition is easy to discern: the judgment about what is a
just or mora] use of force resides not with the collective wisdom of a secular, pluralistic, and
lawfully constituted democratic government, but with individual soldiers, whatever their
ideologies. In essence McMahan advocates the triumph of the government-armed individual
over the judgment of free society writ large.
Does such an explicit rejection of civilian control of the military set off alarm bells for
McMahan? Apparently not. He seems to assume that individual judgments about what is just
and moral would inevitably conform to some unstated philosophical construct of his liking.
That is not the human condition. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Gillette v. United
States-the 1971 case that denied virtually the same claim as McMahan is now making-America
is a "nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of political views, moral codes, and religious
persuasions. "
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We don't allow our troops to overrule civilians on
issues of war and peace.
While we tolerate vastly different and sometimes onerous points of view in our society-and to an extent in our
military-we don't allow the troops to overrule civilians on the critical question of war and peace. Indeed we ask that
the few sacrifice their ideological preferences for the benefit of the many. As the Court recognizes, "The rights of men
in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty." Why?
Because "It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation."
McMahan's scheme invites some frightening scenarios. Suppose that the armed forces, empowered as he would have
them, announce that based on a collection of judgments from certain key members it will fight wars only against
Muslims, people of color, and gays, because such wars are the ones they judge to be moral and just.
It makes no more sense to allow individual troops to pick and choose their wars than it does to allow people to pick
and choose what laws they will obey. When a democracy goes to war, it does so as an expression of the rule of law,
notwithstanding often contentious and partisan political disagreement. It is not for the military, or its individual

members, to involve themselves in such arguments. History has given us too many examples of the disastrous effects
of a politicized military.
In a real way the citizenry's collective assessment of moral rectitude and justness is reflected in the authorities the law
provides. So while U.S. military law does not permit disobedience based on the "dictates of a person's conscience,
religion, or personal philosophy," it also does not require anyone to obey an illegal order. To the contrary, adherence
to a patently illegal order is itself a crime. No soldier is obliged to do what the American people consider unjust or
immoral as reflected in law.
McMahan's essay inevitably raises questions: What sane citizenry would provide advanced combat training to its selfselected military, arm it with the finest weapons on the planet, and then allow it to defy the orders of its
democratically elected commander-in-chief and legislature? Moreover, what kind of democracy is libertarian enough
to permit individuals in its most powerful, authoritarian, and least democratic institution-its military-to pick and
choose the wars they will fight, yet also sufficiently dastardly and despotic to order them to wage an unjust and
immoral war?
There are other logical oddities in McMahan's essay. He suggests that troops that are fighting what he considers to be
an unjust war should not be protected by international humanitarian law. The International Committee of the Red
Cross properly rejects such thinking for the obvious reason that a "denunciation of guilty parties ... would be bound
to arouse controversy and paralyze implementation of the law, since each adversary would claim to be a victim."
More legal paralysis is not what the world needs right now. Decisions about the morality and justness of wars are
rightly the product of the legal architecture the Constitution provides. The wisdom of those decisions ought to be
decided in ballot boxes, legislatures, and courtrooms, not in barracks.
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